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ABSTRACT 
 
Credit ratings have been widely utilized for their ability to convey information to investors easily and quickly. Credit 
ratings agencies have prospered due to their superior positions in the information-gathering process in the business 
world. However, recent news about grade reversals, abrupt downgrades, and unanticipated bankruptcy suggests 
that the market value of credit ratings may have been overstated. Hence, in this study, we evaluate the legitimacy of 
the suggestion that credit rating categories may provide analysts with useful information. 
 
In order to measure the variables in the information environment, we use analyst forecasts. Differences between 
forecasts in the various rating categories are found to be statistically significant. Furthermore, a comparative 
analysis of information intensity for ungraded firms with that of other firms demonstrates that overestimates of 
ungraded firms create problems of the same nature as those in the information environment of firms with 
speculative grades. 
 
In the inter- and intra-category analyses, various factors determine the transparency of the information environment 
for firms of investment grade, including accruals quality, conservatism, the interest coverage ratio, and the 
proportion of intangible assets. However, for less credible firms, such as speculative or ungraded firms, these 
determinants do not function as expected. We find that the interest coverage ratio may be used to provide detailed 
differentiation between less credible firms. This paper introduces a new approach to credit rating categories and 
related strategies, emphasizing the importance of the ability to repay debt. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
n this paper, we empirically examine to what extent broad rating categories1 directly impact the 
characteristics of the forecasts of financial analysts. Firms of investment grade, speculative grade, and 
no grade (ungraded firms) are considered in this study. As Easley and O’Hara (2004) asserted, analysts 
strive to reduce uncertainty and information asymmetry in the market by improving information quality, thereby 
decreasing information risk, which in turn reduces default risk (Francis et al., 2005). In addition to the analysis of 
broad rating categories, we also examine the choices open to firms at the margin of the investment and speculative 
grades compared to those of other firms in the same broad rating category. Finally, in order to demonstrate how 
these categories work, we conduct both inter-group and intra-group analyses, investigating the features of financial 
analyst forecasts in each category and how they differ according to the information environment within the broad 
rating categories. Specifically, we hypothesize that firms with good information environments, as measured by the 
quality of accruals, conservatism, and the interest coverage ratio (hereafter ICR), will exhibit low information 
uncertainty, whereas for firms with opaque information environments, as reflected by the proportion of net 
intangible assets, information uncertainty will be relatively high. 
                                                
1 Commonly used rating categories include AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, and D. Since no superordinate concept of rating categories 
has been established, we use the term “broad rating category” to distinguish investment (AAA, AA, A, BBB) and speculative (BB, B, CCC, CC, 
C, D) grades.  
I 
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Credit ratings are qualified assessments of the probability of default. They have been associated with ex post 
payment defaults and corporate yield spreads (Anderson et al., 2003). Issuer credit ratings, in contrast to issue-
specific credit ratings, indicate default probabilities for the entire firm, independent of the extent of the protections 
afforded to the firm’s creditors (Cheng and Subramanyam, 2007). Investors apply credit ratings to create portfolio 
allocation decisions, particularly those related to pension funds. Banks and insurance companies employ credit 
ratings as investment standards, using them to allocate regulatory capital. Central banks use credit ratings as a proxy 
for the quality of collateral. Corporate managers evaluate corporate policies partly on the basis of how their firms’ 
credit ratings may be affected (Hilscher and Wilson, 2011). Recent events and related arguments focus on the 
importance of understanding if ratings are appropriate for these purposes. 
 
Reports of numerous unexpected defaults and abrupt credit downgrades in recent years call into question the 
informational value of credit ratings. Corporate bond issuers may have incentives to inflate or maintain credit ratings 
because investors use these ratings to evaluate issuers’ financial circumstances and their ability to make payments. 
Ratings have considerable cost implications for companies, including not only the cost of capital, but also 
substantial capital market reactions to rating changes. Despite efforts by rating agencies to reduce opportunistic 
behavior, conflicts of interest may result from their dependence on rating fees paid by bond issuers. Pressure from 
issuers, investment banks, and commercial banks may also affect credit rating agencies (Covitz and Harrison, 2003). 
Since 1968, the revenue structure of credit rating agencies in the United States has moved from investor-based 
compensation (e.g., subscription fees received from investors) to issuer-based payments (e.g., rating fees from the 
assessing firms) due to increasing costs of maintaining the quality of credit ratings and growing demand for more 
ratings coverage (Jung et al., 2012). 
 
The needs of bond issuers and the revenue structure of credit rating agencies indicate how credit ratings can have 
great market value, but little informational value. If this claim is correct, rating-reliant regulation may not be 
optimal; it may require revision or replacement by other criteria-dependent regulation. Table 1 displays the ratings 
performance of Korean firms listed by NICE2 in 2010. Distinctive features are evident between firms of investment 
and speculative grades. 
 
Table 1. Trends of default risk 
(Unit : %) 
Year AAA AA A BBB BB B CCC CC C Investmenta Speculationb Totalc 
1998 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 4.36 36.36 100.00 0.00 - 0.00 16.67 5.88 
1999 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 42.68 0.00 0.00 16.67 0.00 5.63 2.00 
2000 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.33 12.50 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.59 1.01 
2001 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 4.71 33.33 0.00 0.00 50.00 0.52 6.73 2.70 
2002 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.50 25.00 - 0.00 - 0.00 4.40 1.42 
2003 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 33.33 - 0.00 6.45 1.65 
2004 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 11.54 7.69 100.00 - 0.00 0.00 12.20 2.17 
2005 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 7.69 50.00 - 33.33 0.00 8.16 1.57 
2006 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.23 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.47 0.00 0.40 
2007 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 - 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
2008 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.69 0.00 2.94 0.00 - - 0.45 1.64 0.70 
2009 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 9.09 0.00 10.00 - 66.67 0.00 8.06 1.71 
2010 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 10.53 12.50 - 66.67 0.00 10.87 1.63 
Averaged 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.32 3.45 8.14 9.09 3.67 30.43 0.12 5.85 1.55 
a. Investment: referred to investment grade which ranges from AAA to BBB. 
b. Speculation: referred to speculative grade which ranges from BB to C. 
c. Total: referred to all credit grades which range from AAA to C. 
d. Average: average of default rate in each grade which ranges from 1998 to 2010. 
 
 
  
                                                
2 NICE started off as a corporate financial center in 1985, changing its title to the Korea Investors Service in the same year. It was the very first 
company to evaluate corporate notes and bonds in Korea. Since December 2001, it has been affiliated with Moody’s, and 50% of its shares are 
owned by Moody’s. 
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Table 2. Trends of analysts following 
(Unit: number) 
Credit Rating Analysts Followinga 
Investmentb 
AAA 21.90 
13.11 
AA+ 21.25 
AA 20.44 
AA- 19.35 
A+ 15.89 
A 13.21 
A- 11.57 
BBB+ 10.04 
BBB 7.57 
BBB- 5.93 
Speculationc 
BB+ 4.26 
4.68 
BB 6.11 
BB- 2.34 
B+ 3.00 
B 1.36 
B- 4.13 
CCC 4.29 
CC . 
C 10.18 
a. Analysts following: the average number of analysts who analyze the identical firm. 
b. Investment: referred to investment grade which ranges from AAA to BBB. 
c. Speculation: referred to speculative grade which ranges from BB to C. 
 
If the nature of credit rating lies in the prediction of default risk, then there should be the degree of one-tier 
difference between BBB and BB level. The difference in default risk between firms of BBB and BB levels, which 
are on the border of the so-called investment and speculative grades, is large. However, information on credit ratings 
should reflect consistent intervals in default risk between levels. Table 2 displays information related to analyst 
following, where similar results for firms of investment and speculative grades can be observed.  
 
The incremental information contained in broad rating categories is the focus of the paper. The purpose of this paper 
is to inform analysts of the implied differences in information environment between categories. In addition to these 
broad rating categories, information regarding ungraded firms is also analyzed. Ungraded firms are often regarded as 
being guaranteed in advanced economies. However, the features and behavior of these firms in emerging markets 
differ from those in more advanced economies due to their desire to avoid being graded as speculative firms. Our 
analysis of the characteristics of firms of investment and speculative grades and ungraded firms relies on the 
predictions of financial analysts and the information environment in each category. Information overlooked by 
analysts is examined in within-group and inter-group analyses. 
 
Previous studies have investigated the gap between investment and speculative grades by grouping together the 
various tiers of investment and speculative firms on the assumption that incentives to make significant economic 
changes are homogeneously the same. However, the economic choices of firms at the margin of the investment and 
non-investment grades may differ from those of other firms in the same broad rating category. We anticipate that 
firms at the margin are more likely to strive for a higher ratings status by improving operating performance, 
reducing financial leverage, increasing firm size, and reporting positive net present value (NPV) projects to 
demonstrate their future potential. Moreover, firms at the margin may attempt to acquire favorable ratings by 
offering higher fees and putting pressure on rating agencies. Given that firms at the margin of the speculative and 
investment grades have greater incentives and are more likely to experience more favorable ratings outcomes, the 
information environment in marginal firms is expected to compare favorably with those of other firms in the same 
broad rating category. 
 
Finally, we investigate differences in features of financial analyst forecasts between broad rating categories. The link 
between the quality of financial reporting and the information environment has been the focus of several recent 
empirical papers (Francis et al., 2005; Aboody et al., 2005; Chen et al., 2007). For example, Easley and O’Hara 
(2004) argue that amongst other things, accounting information pertaining to a firm’s expected cash flows affects the 
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information environment. Poor-quality reporting impairs the coordination between firms and their investors with 
respect to firm value, thereby creating information uncertainty. Accruals quality and conservatism are directly linked 
to the characteristics of analyst forecasts. Accruals quality captures variations in the mapping of earnings into 
operating cash flows, a key element of the pay-off structure that is of interest to market participants (Francis et al., 
2004). Conservatism has been identified in the corporate governance literature as a means of reducing information 
asymmetry between investors and firms. Thus, firms with good information environments, as measured by the 
quality of accruals and conservatism, are associated with low earnings forecast error and dispersion of forecasts. 
Investors therefore pay close attention to ICR, which represents grade information and ability to repay debt. This 
financial ratio also contributes to a good information environment. For firms with good information environments, 
the importance of the ICR is expected to be more pronounced for firms with undisclosed information such as 
intangible assets. Intangible assets include information about growth options, brand names, distribution networks, 
and organizational capital (Cornell et al., 1989). However, due to accounting reporting system, many intangible 
assets are omitted from the statement of financial position. Therefore, investors depend only on public information, 
whereas rating agencies use private information offered by management. Thus, greater information uncertainty may 
be associated with firms with a higher proportion of intangible assets. 
 
This paper contributes to the finance research in the following ways. First, we contribute to the continuing policy 
debate regarding the proper role of credit ratings in investment and business and the call for potential alternatives to 
credit ratings. In the aftermath of the Enron and WorldCom tragedies, credit ratings have been criticized for their 
inability to predict firms’ underlying default risk in a timely manner. Academic researchers have vigorously 
discussed the importance of the information reflected in credit ratings. However, the results of these studies have 
been inconclusive. In this study, we introduce a new approach to examining how information in broad rating 
categories can affect analyst forecasts. By reflecting different story on credit ratings, category information provides 
valuable guidelines for analysts. 
 
Second, this paper adds to the extensive list of empirical papers on the information environment (Petersen and 
Rajan, 1994; Berger and Udell, 1995) by clarifying previously unexplored areas such as the margin of investment, 
ungraded firms, and firms of speculative grades. While previous studies tend to analyze the difference between firms 
of investment grade and those of non-investment grade by presuming that firms in the same category have identical 
incentives, we posit that the different incentives of firms at the margin can evoke information uncertainty. In 
addition, ungraded firms, such as those associated with the national government, are not subjected to rating because 
they are guaranteed. However, certain firms voluntarily choose to be ungraded due to the risk of being downgraded 
to junk status. Information uncertainty may also alert investors to the fact that certain information in ungraded firms 
may be similar to that of firms of non-investment grade. 
 
Finally, interpretation of the information in broad rating categories may differ according to the information 
environment, especially due to the effect of accounting information, even for firms within the same broad rating 
category. The information environment may be affected by accruals quality, conservatism, the ICR, and the 
proportion of intangible assets. Accruals quality and conservatism, which may be used as a proxy for earnings 
quality, represent a transparent information environment characterized by relatively low information uncertainty and 
allowing accurate prediction of future earnings by financial analysts. 
 
The paper proceeds as follows. We discuss related literature and the hypotheses in section 2. Section 3 outlines the 
research design. Section 4 provides data, while section 5 presents the empirical results. Section 6 concludes the 
paper. 
 
RELATED RESEARCH AND HYPOTHESES DEVELOPMENT 
 
Background on Credit Ratings 
 
Credit rating agencies such as Moody’s, Standard & Poor’s (S&P), and Fitch assess credit risk and assign credit 
ratings on issues, issuers, or both. Credit risk is defined as the likelihood that a bond issuer will default due to failure 
to make principal and interest payments within the bond’s maturity period. A credit rating is fundamentally an 
overall assessment offered by a rating agency about the credit default risk of an issuer. It is denoted with letter 
ratings. Each agency employs both ordinal (e.g., A, B, C, D) and cardinal (e.g., AAA, AA, A) ratings. For instance, 
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S&P uses ten broad categories (i.e., AAA, AA, A, BBB, BB, B, CCC, CC, C, D). Each broad rating category from 
AA to CCC is divided into three subcategories, or “notches” (+/none/-). If rating agencies announce a downgrade, it 
means that the issuer’s credit value has been reduced and the probability of default risk has increased. 
 
Credit rating agencies also evaluate companies that can be generally classified in investment or speculative grades; 
the differences between these two broad categories can greatly affect a firm’s ability to borrow and expand or 
maintain its operations. For example, an AAA bond is an investment grade bond of the highest quality. A BBB bond 
is of lower quality, but still qualifies for investment, while a B or CCC bond is treated as speculative, meaning that it 
carries considerable financial risk and should be avoided, if possible. 
 
Investment grade bonds are rated independently. Investment grade indicates that a bond is sufficiently outstanding to 
be a rationally safe investment. For these bonds, a certain amount of return is guaranteed; the rating indicates a low 
possibility of default or other problems that might aggravate the possibility of bond repayment. Investors usually 
prefer the best investment grade bonds. Under certain circumstances, they may be willing or forced to accept bonds 
of lower grades for speculation or as part of a parcel where bonds of different grades are combined together and sold 
as one unit rather than individually. Risk-averse investors are watchful of bonds with low ratings, as they generally 
do not want to expose themselves to high and avoidable risks. In exceptional cases, some speculators may take on 
bonds at the higher end of the speculative rating table. 
 
Certain types of bonds are ungraded. Generally, bonds issued by the national government are not subjected to rating 
because they are guaranteed. However, municipal bonds may be rated, depending on the nation and the policy of 
ratings agencies. Just like companies, municipalities can experience a cash flow crisis if their former investment 
grade bonds experience an unexpected downgrade and are classified as speculative by rating agencies, making it 
tough to access credit for various municipal endeavors. 
 
The primary goal of credit assessment is to examine the ability to pay back interest and principal and prevent any 
possible loss to uninformed investors. Credit assessment provides opportunities to firms to fund themselves at low 
cost without security or guarantee. The subject of credit ratings is not a business entity (the issuer), but the issuer’s 
respective bonds. However, credit ratings of issued bonds may be used as annual “overall performance grades”. The 
ability to repay is widely accepted as a measure of the soundness of a firm. When it cannot pay the principal on the 
issued bonds, a firm is in danger of bankruptcy. In addition, credit ratings are used as the basis for determining 
interest rates; thus, they are closely related to the cost of capital for firms. Interested parties cannot afford to retrieve, 
inspect, and analyze data for all the firms in which they are interested. Therefore, credit rating agencies perform 
these analyses as a service. As a result, credit ratings are widely trusted in private contracting, useful in regulation of 
the financial industry, and helpful as a device for measuring and constraining risk. Commercial banks, insurance 
companies, and pension funds are among the institutions that must comply with regulatory rules based on credit 
ratings. Many investors can only hold bonds with investment grade ratings or must be equipped with sufficient 
capital based on the ratings of the bonds they hold. Thus, ratings are key in disseminating information in financial 
markets. They are considered important by legislators, regulators, issuers, and investors alike. 
 
The use of credit ratings varies between nations. The U.S. began applying credit ratings to bank inspections and 
broadened their range of application to insurance companies, tasks on security issues, and other areas. The use of 
credit ratings in financial supervision is extensive in the U.S. The current global trend shows that application of 
credit ratings is increasing among countries in the European Union and emerging market states. U.S. banks and 
savings and loans companies are allowed to invest in securities of investment grade (e.g., BBB of S&P’s) for 
pensions, securities above S&P’s A grade, and money market funds above S&P’s A1 grade. Securities companies 
are also permitted to underwrite investment level securities only. The Securities and Exchange Commission applies 
simplified registration and disclosure procedures for investment grade securities or asset-backed securities. 
Similarly, the Canadian government applies a simplified registration procedure when investment grade firms issue 
non-convertible bonds or preferred stocks. In Japan, firms of investment grade are allowed to issue commercial 
paper, and firms with grades over AA can issue Euro-Yen bonds. In Switzerland, only investment level bonds can 
go public. In countries with emerging markets, firms must meet certain credit grade qualifications in order to issue 
commercial papers (Indonesia), issue bonds overseas (Chile), or issue bonds at all (Mexico). The Taiwanese central 
bank can only hold bonds from other Taiwanese banks over a certain grade. The Indian Loan Investment Company 
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can take savings from firms that meet a certain grade qualification. Korea makes less use of credit ratings in 
financial supervisory matters in comparison with other developed countries. 
 
Related Research on Individual Analyst Forecasts 
 
In this section, we describe the literature related to two frequently studied properties of analysts’ earnings forecasts: 
the accuracy of individual analyst forecasts, and the dispersion in forecasts provided by all analysts for a firm. 
 
Analyst Forecast Error 
 
There are two reasons why studying the accuracy of earnings forecasts of individual analysts is important. First, 
investors gain from utilizing more accurate forecasts. Earnings forecasts are fundamental to analysts’ stock 
recommendations; more accurate forecasters may provide more profitable stock recommendations, fulfilling the old 
saying that better input leads to better output (Loh and Mian, 2005). Second, from a researcher’s perspective, 
identifying more accurate forecasts is important because the market’s expectation should reflect the most accurate 
information available at any point in time in an efficient market. Research that uses analyst forecasts as a proxy for 
market earnings expectations should take into account differences in investors’ ability to identify and weigh earnings 
forecasts of individual analysts (Maines, 1996). 
 
Forecast error is also significant to analysts. Analysts who publish more accurate forecasts are likely to be rewarded, 
and those who publish less accurate forecasts may be forced to change brokerage houses or find a new career. 
Rewards for accurate forecasts may come in the form of recognition and/or career advancement (Hong and Kubik, 
2003). Mikhail et al. (1999) examine the relation between forecast error and analyst turnover. Analysts who 
contribute forecasts to the Zacks database are more likely to change brokerage firms or depart the profession 
altogether when their forecast accuracy is lower than that of their peers. They find that the accuracy of analysts’ 
stock recommendations is unrelated to analyst turnover, implying that analysts may have more incentive to deliver 
accurate forecasts than to offer profitable stock recommendations. 
 
Forecasts from different analysts for the same firm diverge on a number of dimensions, such as age and implied 
information. Recent forecasts are generally accepted as more accurate (O’Brien, 1988). Gleason and Lee (2003) find 
that the price impact of forecasts on price depends on whether the analyst brings new information to the market. 
Earnings forecast revisions may bring previous forecasts closer to the current consensus (generally referred to as 
herding), or they may diverge from the existing consensus. Gleason and Lee (2003) show that forecast revisions are 
more informative (i.e., they result in greater price responses) when they diverge from the consensus. Clement and 
Tse (2005) show that bold (diverging) forecasts have a greater impact on price because they are more accurate than 
other forecasts. Moreover, they find that bold forecast revisions have a tendency to improve previous forecasts by 
the same analyst to a greater extent than herding forecasts. This finding is consistent with the notion that bold 
forecasts transfer more of an analyst’s private information about the firm. In agreement with the expectations of 
Trueman (1994), Clement and Tse (2005) also reveal that minor forecast revisions are more highly correlated with 
forecast errors after revision. 
 
Using analyst forecast data from the International Brokers’ Estimate System (IBES), Clement (1999) examines the 
associations among analyst experience, affiliation, specialization, and forecast accuracy. Like Mikhail et al. (1997), 
Clement (1999) also finds that the earnings forecasts of analysts with more experience are more accurate. Moreover, 
analysts affiliated with large brokerage houses and those who cover fewer firms and industries provide more 
accurate forecasts. Thus, available resources and specialization have a positive impact on forecast accuracy. Jacob et 
al. (1999) argue that certain analyst–firm alignments (referred to as “analyst aptitude”) may be more successful in 
terms of accurate forecasting because some analysts may have a natural aptitude for forecasting earnings for certain 
firms. Increases in firm-specific experience, as measured by the length of time over which analysts have made 
earnings forecasts for a firm, may simply be a manifestation of analysts’ ability to forecast earnings better for that 
firm. They reconsider Clement (1999)’s results, illustrating that the positive association between experience and 
forecast accuracy diminishes after controlling for analyst–firm alignment. They conclude that analysts’ aptitude 
rather than overall experience is more likely to explain analyst forecasting superiority. 
Dispersion in Analyst Forecasts as a Measure of Investor Uncertainty 
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Forecast dispersion (measured as the standard deviation in analyst forecasts), which is a signal of the extent of 
analyst discrepancy about a firm’s upcoming earnings, is frequently used as a proxy for information uncertainty. 
Barron et al. (1998), in a methodical analysis, find that the mean forecast error, forecast dispersion, and number of 
forecasts can be used to estimate the total uncertainty and consensus of analysts. They show that higher dispersion 
implies higher total uncertainty, but lower consensus. More importantly, they illustrate that forecast dispersion is a 
measure of analysts’ idiosyncratic uncertainty, and therefore does not fully capture total earnings uncertainty. Total 
uncertainty is a combination of forecast dispersion and the common uncertainty shared by all analysts. Decreases in 
forecast dispersion may not signal a decrease in overall uncertainty, but rather a decrease in uncertainty related to 
the idiosyncratic component of analyst forecasts. 
 
Barron et al. (2002) use the measures of consensus and uncertainty from their previous study to observe the 
dispersion in annual earnings forecasts between analysts before and after interim earnings announcements. They 
investigate the reaction to earnings announcements after gathering of private information by analysts, as observed 
through forecast revision activity. Release of public information such as earnings announcements may decrease the 
need for private information gathering. Barron et al. (2002) find that consensus among analysts actually decreases in 
the days following the earnings announcement, which is consistent with analysts embedding more private 
information into their forecast revisions. 
 
Using data from the IBES, Diether et al. (2002) find that stocks with high (low) earnings forecast dispersion earn 
negative (positive) returns in the subsequent month. The difference in returns between stocks in the highest and 
lowest quintiles of forecast dispersion is 9.48%. They also find that the forecast dispersion effect is strongest for 
small stocks, although return differences in larger stocks are examined as well. 
 
Johnson (2004) argues that the finding in Diether et al. (2002) is consistent with a standard asset pricing model 
where forecast dispersion acts as a proxy for uncertainty about an upcoming signal of the value of the underlying 
asset. He suggests that this effect should be most obvious in highly leveraged firms where the value of equity should 
increase with uncertainty, leading to lower returns in the future. Results based on IBES forecast data are consistent 
with these predictions; the negative relation between forecast dispersion and future returns reported by Diether et al. 
(2002) exists only for firms with dangerous debt. 
 
This study investigates whether the information contained in broad rating categories is properly construed by 
financial analysts, the vital interpreters of information in capital markets. Financial analysts are generally known to 
be superior to common investors in terms of information acquisition and interpretation. In this study, the impact of 
broad rating category on two different measures, forecast error and dispersion of forecasting, is examined. 
 
Hypotheses Development 
 
Credit ratings offer information about the likelihood of firm default and recovery rates of generally available 
securities, limiting duplication of effort in financial markets. They allow rapid assessment of the broad risk 
properties of tens of thousands of individual securities using a single well-known scale (Becker and Milbourn, 
2010). In addition, ratings are utilized extensively in regulation and private contracting, and as a means for 
measuring and limiting risk. The quality of ratings is thus quite significant for the proper working of the financial 
system. Despite the importance of a stable ratings industry, the provision of accurate ratings is complicated by the 
weird market structure of the industry. The ratings industry in the U.S.is controlled by only three players: Moody’s, 
S&P, and Fitch. This could be called a monopoly structure. Second, the firms being rated pay for assessment by 
credit rating agencies. Once ratings are produced, they are made publicly available, and investors may utilize them 
free of charge. Users of ratings, such as investors who are considering buying securities, obviously desire accurate 
ratings. However, the firms whose bonds are being rated obviously prefer favorable ratings and may not necessarily 
desire accurate ones. Since the revenues of rating agencies come from issuers, a basic conflict exists between the 
desire of agencies to satisfy their individual paying customers and their own need to maintain the accuracy of the 
information they publish and the content of credit ratings for the sake of their reputation. These various industry 
attributes and the conflict between the needs of agencies and bond issuers have raised questions about the value of 
credit ratings. 
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The value of an agency’s credit ratings, like an accountant’s audit opinions, should lie in its independent, reliable 
assessment of a firm’s financial and non-financial data. Credit ratings should predict the likelihood of default on 
financial obligations and the expected repayment for actual bankruptcy. However, letter ratings such as AAA, BB, 
and C do not always convey pertinent information for predicting default risk, although this is their primary aim. The 
setup of the letter grade system implies that consistent differences exist between intervals. However, based on trends 
of default risk (Table 1), we can infer that this difference is larger than one level for some intervals. This 
inconsistency is more apparent between BBB and BB levels. BBB and BB grades are commonly known as resting 
on the border between investment and speculative grades. 
 
In addition to verifying the usefulness of credit rating category information, we examine the information 
environment of ungraded firms, which has never been done in previous research. This is an unprecedented field of 
study because ungraded firms are often regarded as being guaranteed in advanced countries. However, these firms 
have different features in emerging markets due to their desire to avoid being rated as speculative firms. It is 
common practice to grant ungraded firms above-average grades in emerging markets, as they are usually 
outstanding and well-known companies. However, these grades may be unrealistically elevated due to the absence 
of information for ungraded firms. Thus, we first examine the information characteristics of ungraded firms, 
comparing them with the information traits of firms of investment and speculative grades. If ungraded firms are 
incorrectly graded as average, investors may be at risk if they choose to invest in these firms. Thus, a new 
investment strategy is required for ungraded firms.  
 
We employ traits of analyst forecasts to compare the information environment in respective categories. Financial 
analysts are known as monitors and information intermediaries. By monitoring managerial actions, analysts may 
reduce agency costs related to the separation of ownership and control (Jensen and Meckling, 1976). This reduction 
in agency cost may increase a firm’s expected cash flows (Chung and Jo, 1996) and decrease its leverage, thereby 
reducing its default risk (Ogden, 1987). By acting as significant information intermediaries between managers and 
market participants (Healy and Palepu, 2001; Frankel and Li, 2004) and by engaging in private information search 
activities, analysts may improve the quality of information in capital markets, thereby reducing uncertainty and 
information asymmetry in those markets. Information risk then decreases (Easley and O’Hara, 2004), which in turn 
reduces default risk (Francis et al., 2005). 
 
In the analysis of characteristics of firms of investment and speculative grades and ungraded firms and the 
predictions of financial analysts, we hypothesize that: 
 
H1: The characteristics of analyst forecasts differ between firms of investment grade, speculative grade, and no 
grade. 
 
H1a: Forecast errors of financial analysts differ between firms of investment grade, speculative grade, and no grade. 
 
H1b: Forecast dispersion of financial analysts differs between firms of investment grade, speculative grade, and no 
grade. 
 
Among companies whose credit ratings are at the border between investment and speculative grades, credit rating 
changes may confer greater benefits or costs in future for companies that rely more on debt financing. For instance, 
pension funds and financial intermediaries are officially regulated in cases of investment in firms of speculative 
grade, whereas individual investors may make use of the distinction between investment and speculative grades to 
determine their choices. Managers of firms at the margin of the speculative and investment grades also attract the 
attention of bondholders. Such firms may have a stronger incentive to increase or preserve credit ratings, and may 
attempt to inflate credit ratings by improving operational performance, decreasing financial leverage, increasing 
external size, and reporting positive and promising NPV projects to prove their future growth potential. Moreover, 
firms at the margin may obtain favorable ratings by offering higher fees to and putting pressure on rating agencies. 
Given that firms at the border of speculative and investment grades have these greater incentives and are more apt to 
report favorable ratings outcomes, the information environment in these firms is expected to be less favorable 
compared to that in other firms in the same broad rating category. If ratings are higher than the actual operating 
performance, and they do not accurately reflect the circumstances of the firm, the amount of information released 
may be lower compared to that of other firms. This leads to the following hypothesis: 
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H2: Firms whose credit ratings are at the border of the investment and speculative grades will release different 
amounts of information in analyst forecasts in comparison to firms of the same grade. 
 
H2a: Firms at the border of investment and speculative grades differ in the amount of forecast error in comparison 
to firms of the same grade. 
 
H2b: Firms at the border of investment and speculative grades differ in terms of forecast dispersion in comparison 
to firms of the same grade. 
 
Incremental information that may be overlooked by analysts is included in our within-group and inter-group 
analyses. Financial analysts base their forecasts for firms in the rating categories on accounting information. These 
forecasts may differ due to changes in the amount of accounting information that is reported. The following 
hypotheses are intended to address this phenomenon. 
 
First, the information environment on which analyst forecasts are based may change depending on the earnings 
quality, as estimated by accruals quality and conservatism. Specifically, firms with good information environments 
are expected to show a high degree of information disclosure. The results of previous studies have shown that 
financial analysts modify their forecasts as firms disclose information about their actual performance. Thus, this 
accounting information is useful in the decision-making process involved in creating analyst forecasts and stock 
recommendations (Imhoff, 1992). Bradshaw et al. (2001) define earnings quality as the magnitude of accruals, 
which may differ in forecasts by different analysts. Lim (2001) and Das et al. (1998) report that analyst forecasts are 
influenced by earnings quality, and that analyst forecasts shift in accordance with the predictability of earnings. 
 
Second, we add the degree of conservatism as one of the variables related to the information environment in order to 
measure earnings quality. Thus, earnings quality is measured in two ways using accruals quality and conservatism in 
order to determine more concrete and valid information. The amount of information disclosed is therefore expected 
to be greater in a more transparent environment in firms with high earnings quality within the same broad rating 
category. 
 
Third, the ICR may be the most appropriate financial ratio for determining the ability to repay debt, which is the 
information necessary to determine the broad rating category. The most important financial ratio investors should 
take into account when interpreting information regarding broad rating category is the one that shows whether a firm 
possesses the ability to repay debt. Firms of investment grade have previously demonstrated their ability to repay, so 
the ICR may not be as important for these firms. However, the ability to repay of firms of speculative grade or 
ungraded firms may still be questioned depending on the ICR even within the same broad rating category. A firm of 
speculative grade may be subject to arbitrage when it is relegated to a speculative grade despite its ability to repay 
debt. Because no information is available for ungraded firms, the extent to which they are equipped to repay debt 
may be unknown. 
 
Finally, the intrinsic value of intangible assets may be questioned. Intangible assets involve growth opportunity, 
brand value, distribution channels, and organizational capital, including human resources. However, the verifiability 
and faithful representation of these firms may be low. These are subconstituents of reliability, one of the qualitative 
characteristics of accounting information. Financial analysts occupy a superior position to that of common investors, 
who must rely heavily on publicly disclosed information; however, their position may be no better than that of credit 
rating agencies. Thus, this paper proposes the following hypotheses based upon our suggestion that the more 
significant the intangible assets, the more opaque the information environment will be, making it difficult for 
financial analysts to interpret category information. 
 
H3: Characteristics of analyst forecasts for firms of investment and speculative grades and ungraded firms will vary 
in accordance with accruals quality, conservatism, the ICR, and the proportion of intangible assets. 
 
H3a: Forecast error for firms of investment and speculative grades and ungraded firms will vary in accordance with 
accruals quality, conservatism, the ICR, and the proportion of intangible assets. 
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H3b: Forecast dispersion for firms of investment and speculative grades and ungraded firms will vary in accordance 
with accruals quality, conservatism, the ICR, and the proportion of intangible assets. 
 
RESEARCH DESIGN 
 
Characteristics of Analyst Forecasts 
 
We measure forecast error for each firm-year observation based on the absolute value of the difference between the 
firms’ forecasted and actual earnings, divided by the stock price on the date of forecast: 
 
FOREERRORit = | FORECASTit – EARNit | / PRICEit  (1) 
 
where FOREERRORit is the absolute earnings per share forecast error of firm i in year t, FORECASTit is the earnings 
per share forecast of period t earnings, EARNt is the actual earnings per share of firm i in year t, and PRICEit is the 
adjusted stock price for firm i at the time of forecast t. Thus, a firm attribute that is positively associated with 
FOREERRORit signals that the attribute indicates less accurate analyst forecasts. 
 
Forecast dispersion is analyzed by observing the forecast distribution of analysts in charge of forecasting for certain 
firms. The forecast distribution is measured using the firm-year standard deviation of forecasts. 
 
DISPit = STDit / PRICEit  (2) 
 
DISPit in equation (2) represents forecast dispersion of firm i in year t. It is computed as STDit, the standard 
deviation of analyst forecasts, divided by the beginning adjusted stock price. 
 
Accruals Quality 
 
Accruals quality is estimated in two ways in this paper. Current accruals are set as the dependent variable, as in 
Dechow and Dichev (2002). It is regressed with operating cash flows of the previous, current, and following years as 
independent variables. In another model developed by Francis et al. (2005),3 applied in equation (4), current 
accruals are regressed with operating cash flows of the previous, current, and following years and changes in 
accounts receivable, property, plant, and equipment as independent variables. 
 
TCAt = α + β1 CFOt– 1 + β2 CFOt + β3 CFOt+1 + εt  (3) 
 
TCAt = α + β1 CFOt– 1 + β2 CFOt + β3 CFOt+1 + β4 ΔSALESt + β5 ΔPPEt + εt  (4) 
 
Where 
 
TCAt = {(ΔCURRASET – ΔCASH) – (ΔCURRLIAB – ΔCURRLONGLIAB)} / AVERAGE(ASSET) 
CFOt = (OPCF) / AVERAGE(ASSET) 
SALESt = (SALES) / AVERAGE(ASSET) 
PPEt = (TANASSET – LAND – CIP) / AVERAGE(ASSET) 
CURRASET : current asset 
CASH : cash 
CURRLIAB : current liability 
CURRLONGLIAB : long-term current liability 
AVERAGE(ASSET) : (total asset at time t + total asset at time t – 1) / 2 
OPCF : operating cash flow  
SALES : total sales 
TANASSET : tangible asset 
LAND : land 
CIP : construction in progress 
                                                
3 Francis et al. (2005) develop the suggestion of Dechow and Dichev (2002) further by embracing the model of McNichols (2002). According to 
Francis et al. (2005), current accruals are influenced by operating cash flows of the previous, current, and following years, and by changes in 
sales and property, plant, and equipment. 
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The residuals in equations (3) and (4) represent the accruals that are not realized in cash flow. In this study, accruals 
quality is computed using the absolute value of these residuals. When this value is substantial, poor accruals quality 
is inferred, as accruals would not be converted to cash flow regardless of the sign (positive or negative). In other 
words, the figure obtained in equation (5) is negatively related to accruals quality. 
 
AQit = –│ εit │  (5) 
 
Conservatism 
 
The proxy for conservatism is obtained from the following reverse regression model of Basu (1997), which analyzes 
the relation between net income and stock returns. He defines conservatism as a phenomenon where a decrease in 
net income is immediately recognized as bad news, but reaction to an increase in income is delayed until its 
realization. Measurement of conservatism using net income and stock returns is based on this definition. That is, loss 
is more rapidly reflected in stock price than gain. Therefore, the coefficient found in regression analyses on loss and 
negative stock returns is more significant than that of gain and positive stock returns. In Basu’s (1997) model, β3 is 
an indicator of conservatism. The larger the coefficient, the more conservative the particular accounting system is. 
 
XPt = α + β1 DRt + β2 Rt + β3 DRt · Rt + εt  (6) 
 
Where 
 
XPt : net income in year t/ending stock price in year t – 1 
DRt : a dummy variable that is 1 when stock return is negative, otherwise 0 
Rt : accumulated annual stock return from April in year t – 1 to March in year t. 
 
Next, we adopt the discrepancy between book and market values with reference to Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and 
Zhang (2000). 
 
CONS = 1– (BVt / MVt)  (7) 
 
Where 
 
BV : book value; 
MV : market value. 
 
Under conservatism, net assets are under-accounted and may be of less value that market assets. In this case, book 
value divided by market value becomes <1. Therefore, equation (7) represents the discrepancy between book and 
market values, and the product is expected to be higher with increased conservatism. 
 
Interest Coverage Ratio (ICR) 
 
The ICR is used to determine a company’s ability to pay interest on outstanding debt. The ICR is calculated by 
dividing a company's earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) from one period by the company's interest 
expenses for the same period: 
 
Interest Coverage Ratio = EBIT(Earnings before Interests and Taxes) / Interest Expenses  (8) 
 
The lower the ratio, the more the company is burdened by debt expense. When the ICR is ≤1.5, the company’s 
ability to meet interest expenses may be questionable. An ICR <1 indicates that the company is not generating 
sufficient revenues to satisfy interest expenses. 
 
Net Intangible Assets 
 
The value of using net intangible assets lies in accurate measurement of this variable. The market value method, 
abnormal earnings model, and accounting-based evaluation methods can be used for this purpose. In the market 
The Journal of Applied Business Research – January/February 2016 Volume 32, Number 1 
Copyright by author(s); CC-BY 212 The Clute Institute 
value method, intangible assets are estimated as the difference between the book value and market value of a firm. 
That is, the measure is computed as the difference between monetary assets in financial statements and the fair value 
of tangible assets based on the stock market value and fair value of liability. However, two problems arise with the 
market value method. Due to variability in the moment of measurement, the market value is uncertain using this 
method. In addition, the degree of discretion in determining the fair value of the components of liability, monetary 
assets, and tangible assets may be excessive. Discretion in measurement of normal earnings, abnormal earnings, and 
the cost of capital is a shortcoming of the abnormal earnings model of Ohlson. Nevertheless, as the model has been 
more often tested in research, it has become widely accepted as an appropriate model for intellectual property 
assessment in empirical studies evaluating intangible assets such as corporate goodwill. 
 
In this study, an abnormal earnings model using an accounting-based valuation method which has proved effective 
in intellectual property assessment in previous studies is adopted to measure net intangible assets. Using the 
definition in Ohlson’s model, firm value is the sum of the book value of equity and the present value of future 
abnormal earnings, as shown in equation (9). 
 
∞ 
Pt = yt + ∑ ( 1 + r ) –τ · Et [xat+τ]  (9) 
τ=1 
 
Future abnormal earnings is here defined as the difference between net income and the cost of capital (i.e., net 
income minus the beginning book value times the cost of capital). 
 
xat ≡ xt – ( xt · yt–1 )   (10) 
 
The cost of capital, which can also be interpreted as normal earnings, introduces the notion of abnormal earnings. 
Abnormal earnings are the unexpected gain beyond normal earnings. The rate of normal earnings is required in 
order to compute abnormal earnings. It should be equal to the cost of capital, since the value for existing 
shareholders must be sustained. That is, when the future expected earnings ratio is expected to exceed the cost of 
capital, intangible assets derived from abnormal earnings may be approved. The return on equity (ROE) is often 
used as a proxy for the cost of capital, but we adopt the capital asset prizing model to measure the cost of capital in 
this study. 
 
rt = r ft + βt · PREM (11) 
 
To determine a risk-free rate, the annual average return of housing corporate bonds (first class, 5 years) is applied, 
and for the beta coefficient, we use the figure attained from the market value model, which is adopted to calculate 
abnormal returns. We assume the risk premium to be 8%. Then, equation (9) is simplified as equation (12). 
Consequently, the market value is equivalent to the book value modified by abnormal earnings and other 
information. 
 
Pt = yt + α1 xat + α2 υ i   (12) 
 
Elimination of υ i, the value-relevant event that can alter financial statements but cannot be estimated, leaves us with 
abnormal earnings as a sole determinant of the difference between book value and market value as well as the 
intangible asset (goodwill). Even when the present value of abnormal earnings is not recognized as goodwill, it is 
ultimately reflected in the stock price, which leads to the difference between market and book values. Thus, if a firm 
possesses considerable intangible assets, future abnormal earnings are expected to be positive for a certain period, 
meaning that the market value will exceed the book value. The market value falls short of the book value in the 
opposite case. 
 
The present value of future expected abnormal earnings must be measured for a certain period (t) by estimating the 
earnings persistence coefficient (ω) in order to calculate the present value of future abnormal earnings accurately. 
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xat+1 = ω xat + υ t + εt+1   (13) 
 
Pt = yt + ∑ ( 1 + r ) –τ · Et [xat+τ]   (14) 
 τ=1 
 
Since the primary purpose of this study is not to achieve accurate measurement of intangible assets, we only 
consider abnormal earnings of the first year divided by total assets from equation (10) in our regression model on the 
assumption that firms showing considerable abnormal earnings in the first year would display relatively significant 
abnormal earnings in the second year as well. 
 
Research Design for Tests of H1, H2, and H3 
 
Paired t-test and multiple regression analysis are carried out to determine the significance of independent variables 
and to verify inter-category (H1, H2) and intra-category differences (H3). Forecast error and forecast dispersion are 
often utilized as dependent variables. Their respective definitions can be found in section 3.1. 
 
The paired t-test for inter-group forecast errors, forecast dispersion, and other parameters is adopted to test H1, 
which examines differences between firms of investment and speculative grades and ungraded firms. In order to test 
H2, we first select the lowest of the investment grades (BBB-) and the highest of the speculative grades (BB+), 
using the difference in forecast error, forecast dispersion, and other parameters between the two grades to investigate 
differences in information environment. 
 
By including accruals quality, conservatism, the ICR, intangible assets, and other parameters as independent 
variables in the regression, we analyze the information environment within intervals (H3). 
 
FOREERROR(or DISP) = α + β1(INDEPENDENT VARIABLES) + β2ASSET + β3FOLLOW +  
β4DIFF + β5LEV + β6 ROE + β7 BIG4 + YEAR_DUMMY + εt   (15) 
 
Where 
 
INDEPENDENT VARIABLES : accruals quality, conservatism, ICR, net intangible assets; 
ASSET : natural log of total assets of respective firms; 
FOLLOW : number of analysts providing forecasts of respective firms in the corresponding year; 
DIFF : number of days between the forecast day and fiscal year-end; 
LEV : leverage of corresponding firms (total liabilities / total assets); 
ROE : return on equity of corresponding firms ( net income / equity ); 
BIG4 : If one of the Big 4 auditing firms, 1, and otherwise 0. 
 
We control for firm size (ASSET), measured as the natural logarithm of total assets, as a proxy for the general 
information environment for a firm (Atiase, 1985). In addition, we include analyst following (FOLLOW) in 
accordance with Lys and Soo (1995)’s suggestion that greater analyst following indicates more intense competition 
among analysts and greater incentive for analysts to enhance forecast accuracy. We further control for forecast 
horizon (DIFF), the length of time between the forecasting date and the earnings announcement date. DIFF is likely 
to affect the amount of information available to analysts and forecast accuracy, such that DIFF is predicted to be 
positively associated with forecast error. Previous research (Brown et al., 1987; O'Brien and Bhushan, 1990; Brown, 
1993) indicates that longer forecast horizons are associated with less accurate analyst earnings forecasts. Leverage 
(LEV) captures the information demand by debtholders who are particularly concerned about downside risk (Goss 
and Roberts, 2009; Simnett et al., 2009). BIG4 has been used as a proxy for audit quality in prior research (Behn et 
al., 2008; Byard et al., 2011). According to Behn et al. (2008), higher audit quality leads to an increase in 
predictability of accounting income, thus improving the forecast accuracy of analysts and reducing forecast 
dispersion. 
 
We conduct an analysis on respective intervals of credit rating categories using the above regression model to 
identify determinants of the information environment in each credit rating category. The analysis is carried out in 
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each category, with separate analyses for firms of the lowest investment grade and the highest speculative grade. 
Respective independent variables and their detailed definitions are provided in the Results section. 
 
DATA COLLECTION 
 
The observations are selected from firms listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ markets as of December 31, 2010 that 
satisfy the following criteria: (1) companies (except financial companies) listed on the KOSPI and KOSDAQ 
markets with accounts closing in December; (2) companies with credit ratings, financial statements, stock prices, 
and analyst forecasts available in the FN-DataguidePro and KIS-VALUE databases. 
 
We use 11 years of data (2000 to 2010) that satisfy the above conditions. Values for analyst forecast accuracy 
exceeding 200% are eliminated.4 Furthermore, to minimize the effect of outliers, the top and bottom 1% of the 
results for the independent and dependent variables are winsorized. A total of 317,432 firm-year-analyst 
observations are used for the analysis. 
 
FINDINGS 
 
Univariate Tests 
 
Table 3 lists the sample distribution by fiscal year and presents means/medians for the variables. 
 
Table 3. Descriptive statistics 
Variables N Mean Median Standard Deviation Min Max 
FOREERRORa 6,286 0.149 0.050 0.274 0.000 1.432 
DISPb 5,330 0.112 0.024 2.136 0.000 154.182 
AQ1c 5,968 -0.073 -0.048 0.082 -1.632 0.000 
AQ2d 5,968 -0.050 -0.031 0.062 -1.582 0.000 
NIAe 6,286 0.016 0.003 0.156 0.000 8.174 
CONS1f 4,525 -0.439 0.000 17.397 -667.720 66.185 
CONS2g 5,068 -0.404 0.251 22.872 -875.002 315.010 
ICRh 4,839 2.564 2.140 2.111 -4.600 11.220 
ASSETi 6,286 26.254 25.884 1.7213 22.355 32.740 
FOLLOWj 6,286 7.460 4.000 8.207 1.000 45.000 
DIFFk 6,286 177.873 177.671 65.457 1.000 364.000 
LEVl 6,286 0.427 0.420 0.220 0.000 4.717 
ROEm 6,286 0.083 0.102 0.798 -44.340 25.587 
BIG4n 6,286 0.642 1.000 0.479 0.000 1.000 
a. FOREERROR : the absolute value of the difference between the firm's forecasted and actual earnings, divided by the stock price at the forecast 
date. 
b. DISP : the standard deviation of analyst forecasts, divided by the beginning stock price. 
c. AQ1 : current accruals is set as a dependent variable as in Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
d. AQ2 : current accruals is regressed with operating cash flows of the previous, current, and following years, changes in accounts receivable, 
property, plant, and equipment as independent variables, as developed by Francis et al. (2005). 
e. NIA : the difference between net income and cost of capital (i.e., net income minus beginning book value times cost of capital) scaled by initial 
total assets. 
f. CONS1 : The proxy for conservatism is obtained from the model of Basu (1997), which analyzes the relation between net income and stock 
return. 
g. CONS2 : the discrepancy between book and market values with reference to Feltham and Ohlson (1995) and Zhang (2000). 
h. ICR : ICR is calculated by dividing a company's earnings before interest and taxes of one period by the company's interest expenses for the 
same period. 
i. ASSET : natural log of total assets of relevant firms. 
j. FOLOW : number of analysts providing forecasts of relevant firms in the corresponding year. 
k. DIFF: number of days between the forecast day and fiscal year-end. 
l. LEV : leverage of corresponding firms (total liability / total assets). 
m. ROE : return on equity of corresponding firms. 
n. BIG4 : if one of the Big 4 auditing firms, 1, and otherwise 0 
                                                
4 Eddy and Seifert (1992) also eliminated analyst forecast values with large forecast errors. Excluded data may reflect a typing or transcription 
error. 
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The dependent variables observed in the table include forecast error (FOREERROR) and standard deviation of 
forecast error (DISP) measured based on their respective analyst forecasts from Fn-DataGuidePro. Table 3 presents 
means, medians, standard deviations, minimum values, and maximum values. The observation period ranges from 
2000 to 2010. Forecast error is winsorized for the 1% at the extremes. The mean value for forecast error is 0.085, 
and 0.0249 is the median. This connotes that the absolute maximum value of forecast error is 1.432 even after 
winsorizing, indicating that relatively large figures are included in the variable. 
 
The average of number of days between the day of forecasting and fiscal year-end is 180, meaning that financial 
analysts usually make forecasts 180 days in advance. We can infer that firms show 45% leverage on average (mean: 
0.453, median: 0.458, Table 3). The variable ROE displays an average of 0.121 and a median of 0.128, indicating 
that the average value for ROE of the sample firms is 12%. 
 
Overall, no significant differences are observed between the averages for the independent, dependent, and control 
variables and their standard deviations. Hence, the variables are not much skewed, and bias from outliers is not 
considered to be significant. 
 
Table 4 presents the correlations between variables. Apart from the control variables, all correlation coefficients of 
the dependent variables – FOREERROR, DISP – and independent variables – AQ1, AQ2, NIA, CONS1, CONS2, and 
ICR – are low. However, the forecast should be based on the signs of the coefficients rather than their absolute 
values. The correlation coefficients of the dependent and independent variables are negative. Thus, we can infer that 
the higher the value, the lower the forecast error. In addition, the NIA variable is positively related to the dependent 
variables. Thus, we can anticipate that the forecast error increases along with the proportion of intangible assets. 
 
As Table 4 exhibits correlations only, the validity of the investigation must be ensured through a multivariate 
regression model including control variables. In addition, even when all results are considered, all correlation 
coefficients (except those for AQ1 and AQ2) are <0.6, which means that multicollinearity is not a problem. 
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Table 4. Pearson correlation coefficients matrix 
 FOREERROR DISP AQ1 AQ2 NIA CONS1 CONS2 ICR ASSET FOLLOW DIFF LEV ROE BIG4 FOREERROR 1 0.667 -0.076 -0.059 0.162 -0.077 -0.335 -0.009 -0.123 -0.201 0.108 0.158 -0.183 -0.063 
DISP  1 -0.056 -0.039 0.113 -0.035 -0.026 -0.044 -0.119 -0.166 0.012 0.133 -0.278 -0.062 
AQ1   1 0.665 -0.058 0.032 -0.081 -0.004 0.333 0.170 0.002 0.114 0.021 0.124 
AQ2    1 -0.053 0.021 -0.089 0.008 0.333 0.154 -0.001 0.125 0.033 0.134 
NIA     1 -0.042 -0.026 -0.002 -0.056 -0.018 0.000 -0.006 -0.492 -0.090 
CONS1      1 -0.025 0.001 0.068 -0.013 -0.004 -0.024 0.003 -0.049 
CONS2       1 0.001 -0.009 0.004 0.000 -0.048 0.005 0.007 
ICR        1 -0.013 -0.015 0.002 -0.019 0.004 -0.037 
ASSET         1 0.560 0.009 0.405 0.020 0.365 
FOLLOW          1 -0.001 0.026 0.095 0.266 
DIFF           1 -0.006 -0.017 0.007 
LEV            1 -0.030 0.128 
ROE             1 -0.024 
BIG4              1 
The definitions of variables are presented in TABLE 3. 
 
Empirical Results 
 
This section presents evidence from the various tests of credit rating categories and how they are affected by different independent variables. 
 
Broad Rating Category and Analyst Forecast Attributes 
 
Table 5. Results of t-test between rating categories 
 Invest. VS Speculation. Invest. VS Ungraded. Speculation. VS Ungraded. 
Paired-TTEST F-TEST Paired-TTEST F-TEST Paired-TTEST F-TEST 
P-value T-value P-value F-value P-value T-value P-value F-value P-value T-value P-value F-value 
FOREERROR <.0001 33.42 <.0001 6.52 <.0001 29.09 <.0001 1.3 <.0001 -26.21 <.0001 5.02 
DISP <.0001 23.44 <.0001 3.05 <.0001 20.48 <.0001 5296.5 0.2191 0.2191 <.0001 1735.5 
The definitions of variables are presented in TABLE 3. 
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Table 5 presents the results of the t-test for testing of H1. H1 argues that the new category information affects the 
degree of information asymmetry measured by analyst forecast characteristics. The t-test is used to determine 
significant differences between category groups. However, we complement the analysis with regression models in 
the following section, since the t-test is a univariate test. For the test of information asymmetry between firms of 
investment and speculative grades and ungraded firms, the dependent variables (FOREERROR and DISP) are 
utilized in the t-test. These dependent variables are adopted again to verify the difference in averages between 
respective dependent variables in a paired t-test. In addition, we check the model fit by analyzing differences in 
variance. The difference in average is statistically significant at the 99% confidence level, with the exception of the 
DISP variable in the interval between speculative grades and no grade. The validity of the model is further ensured 
using the F-test (analysis of variance) by showing that the regression models of all dependent variables are 
statistically significant at the 99% confidence level. In the F-test, the F-value for differences in variance of firms of 
investment grade and no grade is 5296.54, and that for difference in variance of firms of speculative grade and no 
ungrade is 1735.56. This means that the ungraded firms have a different distribution in comparison with those of 
investment and speculative grades. In summary, this study identifies analyst forecast characteristics using two 
variables (FOREERROR and DISP) in predicting the information environment of firms of investment and 
speculative grades and ungraded firms. We find significant differences in the respective variables in all categories, 
thus supporting H1. 
 
Analyses of Marginal Firms 
 
In this section, firms at the margin of the investment and speculative grades are discussed. These firms have more 
incentives to manage their grades by enhancing or manipulating their performance in comparison to other firms in 
the same broad rating category. Therefore, the intensity of information asymmetry for these firms will be high. 
Hence, we take firms at the margin of the investment and speculative grades (i.e., those of BBB– and BB+ grades) 
and compare them to analyst forecast characteristics to gain understanding of the information environment. 
 
Table 6. Results of the univariate test 
Credit_Grade FOREERROR DISP MEAN MEDIAN MEAN MEDIAN 
Investment 
Grade 
AAA 0.025 0.017 0.017 0.012 
AA+ 0.030 0.012 0.018 0.013 
AA 0.029 0.017 0.027 0.014 
AA- 0.034 0.017 0.024 0.013 
A+ 0.032 0.017 0.021 0.013 
A 0.084 0.024 0.039 0.015 
A- 0.077 0.033 0.041 0.026 
BBB+ 0.134 0.047 0.060 0.027 
BBB 0.178 0.066 0.080 0.045 
BBB- 0.189 0.042 0.119 0.031 
Speculative 
Gradec 
BB+ 0.309 0.122 0.108 0.087 
BB 0.384 0.181 0.157 0.093 
BB- 0.280 0.063 0.103 0.035 
B+ 0.753 0.966 0.206 0.164 
B 0.440 0.337 0.119 0.098 
B- 0.204 0.074 0.166 0.125 
CCC 1.193 1.432 0.426 0.566 
CC - - - - 
C 0.088 0.030 0.044 0.019 
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Figure 1. Fluctuation graph 
 
 
The results do not support our former expectation that analyst forecast characteristics of firms at the border of 
investment and speculative grades would be significantly different from other firms in the same broad rating 
category. The underlying reason for this finding is found in the diverse methods used by these firms to achieve 
higher grades. When marginal firms make strenuous efforts to enhance their situation by improving performance or 
lowering leverage, the information environment of these firms also improves. However, if firms at the margin of the 
investment and speculative grades choose to manage their earnings in pursuit of a better grade, the information 
environment of these firms will be more intense. In this study, the different reactions of firms with identical 
incentives were not examined; thus, we are left with cross-dimensional or mixed results. We will rectify this 
drawback in future studies. 
 
In Table 6, traits of firms of BBB– grade, the lowest of the investment grades, are closer to those of firms of 
speculative grade than to those of firms of investment grade. Although BBB– is officially classified as an investment 
grade in the market, its information environment is similar to that of speculative grades. 
 
Within Category Analyses Using Various Independent Variables 
 
This paper offers a profound and thorough introduction to the information environments in broad rating categories 
through intra-category analysis. Thus, in this section, we investigate how the information environment changes by 
category in accordance with the independent variables examined in this study (AQ1, AQ2, NIA, CONS1, CONS2, 
and ICR), the determinants of the information environment. Both AQ and conservatism are measured twice with 
models suggested by Dechow and Dichev (2002) and by Francis et al. (2005). All three variables – AQ, CONS and 
ICR – form a good informational environment, whereas NIA is associated with an opaque informational 
environment. 
 
As for investment grade, forecast error is significantly and negatively correlated with accruals quality (AQ1, AQ2), 
meaning that the higher the earnings quality, the more transparent the information environment, which implies less 
forecast error. The coefficient of the proportion of intangible assets (NIA) is significantly positive, indicating that the 
more substantial the proportion of intangible assets, the higher the level of uncertainty, which brings about greater 
forecast error. CONS1 and CONS2 represent conservatism of respective firms. Through the coefficients of these 
variables we observe that the more conservative the firm, the lower the forecast error. Identical results are found for 
firms of speculative grade and for ungraded firms. As seen in Table 7, the standard deviation of analyst forecasts 
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(DISP) is identical for forecast error and the other variables. To summarize, in the analysis of firms of investment 
grade, accruals quality and conservatism, the variables associated with a good information environment, are seen to 
reduce information asymmetry within categories. By contrast, in analyzing intangible assets, which are associated 
with an opaque information environment, we found a variable that can intensify information asymmetry within 
categories. Overall, therefore, H3 is supported by the results of our analyses. 
 
In a similar sense, AQ1, AQ2, and NIA are significant to the informational environment confronted by financial 
analysts for firms of speculative grade and ungraded firms. Likewise, AQ1, AQ2, and conservatism form a good 
informational environment in each category, alleviating information asymmetry, whereas NIA is associated with an 
opaque informational environment, intensifying information asymmetry. In conclusion, the corresponding variables 
are determinants of the kind of information environment in which financial analysts make their forecasts. 
 
The analysis of the ICR variable presents rather intriguing results. Forecast error and the standard deviation of 
forecasts for firms of speculative grades and ungraded firms decrease with an increase in ICR, which represents the 
ability to repay debt, while the coefficient of analyst forecasts for firms of investment grade is not statistically 
significant. This suggests that analyst forecast activity for firms of investment grade are not significantly affected by 
ICR, whereas ICR conveys effective information on an opaque information environment for firms of speculative 
grades and ungraded firms. Traditionally, these firms are regarded as not worth investment due to their inability to 
repay debt in comparison to firms of investment grades. However, in the intra-group analysis, we see that the 
information environment may vary in firms of the same category depending on their ability to repay debt. This fact 
reveals that even firms of speculative grades or ungraded firms may be assessed differently in accordance with ICR, 
and that some firms may have been underestimated. Firms of investment grade display relatively less severe 
information environments since they are already assured in the capital market. On the other hand, firms of 
speculative grades and ungraded firms either exhibit no information at all or may vary in their capacity to repay 
debt. Thus, ICR plays a vital role in determining the intensity of the information environment in those firms.
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Table 7. Results of multiple regression within rating categories 
(Panel A. Investment Grade) 
FOREERROR (Investment Grade) 
Variable Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value 
Intercept 0.192 18.50*** 0.194 18.65*** 0.104 10.79*** 0.293 31.54*** 0.482 52.32*** 0.203 19.44*** 
AQ1 -0.132 -12.15***           
AQ2   -0.169 -11.22
***         
NIA     6.663 157.80
***       
CONS1       0.010 16.08     CONS2         -0.025 -91.47
***   
ICR           0.000 0.59 ASSET -0.004 -11.15*** -0.004 -11.17*** -0.002 -6.50*** -0.008 -22.98*** -0.016 -45.30*** -0.005 -11.67*** 
FOLLOW -0.001 -14.76*** -0.001 -14.99*** -0.002 -30.00*** 0.000 -0.81*** 0.002 27.53*** -0.001 -15.17*** 
DIFF 0.000 41.16*** 0.000 41.10*** 0.000 45.46*** 0.000 43.11*** 0.000 43.14*** 0.000 40.93*** 
LEV 0.135 54.04*** 0.135 53.89*** 0.152 65.43*** 0.077 35.80*** -0.004 -1.72* 0.138 54.27*** 
ROE -0.519 -156.77*** -0.520 -156.69*** -0.661 -206.43*** -0.419 -144.99*** -0.311 -102.57*** -0.517 -154.93*** 
BIG4 -0.025 -16.08*** -0.025 -16.35*** -0.018 -12.44*** -0.022 -14.06*** -0.018 -11.96*** -0.027 -17.22*** 
YEAR_DUMMY INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
Adj. R square 0.2450 0.2449 0.3495 0.2062 0.2526 0.2440 
 
DISP (Investment Grade) 
Variable Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value 
Intercept 0.086 21.67*** 0.086 21.76*** 0.051 14.11*** 0.127 35.31*** 0.199 55.69*** 0.092 23.17*** 
AQ1 -0.049 -11.98***           
AQ2   -0.066 -11.57***         
NIA     2.553 159.38***       
CONS1       0.002 7.08     
CONS2         -0.009 -85.57***   
ICR           0.000 0.82 
ASSET -0.001 -10.09*** -0.001 -10.08*** -0.001 -5.30*** -0.003 -22.66*** -0.006 -44.48*** -0.002 -11.10*** 
FOLLOW 0.000 -12.27*** 0.000 -12.48*** -0.001 -27.46*** 0.000 8.29*** 0.001 36.00*** 0.000 -12.23*** 
DIFF 0.000 4.98*** 0.000 4.93*** 0.000 6.49*** 0.000 2.64*** 0.000 1.36 0.000 4.82*** 
LEV 0.043 44.76*** 0.042 44.59*** 0.049 55.58*** 0.030 35.91*** 0.001 0.59 0.043 45.23*** 
ROE -0.173 -137.38*** -0.173 -137.38*** -0.227 -187.03*** -0.167 -148.95*** -0.128 -108.54*** -0.172 -135.87*** 
BIG4 -0.012 -19.70*** -0.012 -19.95*** -0.009 -16.26*** -0.012 -20.04*** -0.011 -18.18*** -0.012 -21.22*** 
YEAR_DUMMY INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
Adj. R square 0.2261 0.2261 0.3352 0.2002 0.2424 0.2239 
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(Panel B. Speculative Grade) 
FOREERROR (Speculative Grade) 
Variable Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value 
Intercept -0.320 -2.65*** 0.299 2.42*** 1.049 8.90*** 0.694 3.57*** 1.047 5.77*** 1.320 11.02*** 
AQ1 -3.127 -29.19***           
AQ2   -3.513 -20.33
***         
NIA     5.085 13.52
***     0.77  
CONS1       -0.060 -3.99
***     
CONS2         -0.001 -0.18   ICR           -0.031 -2.58
*** 
ASSET -0.024 -5.48*** -0.042 -9.16*** -0.062 -13.66*** -0.039 -4.99*** -0.054 -7.38*** -0.074 -16.22*** 
FOLLOW -0.006 -7.72*** -0.008 -10.25*** -0.014 -15.02*** 0.002 2.74*** 0.004 5.14*** -0.009 -10.19*** 
DIFF 0.000 8.31*** 0.000 6.91*** 0.000 8.09*** 0.000 5.79*** 0.000 5.54*** 0.000 6.82*** 
LEV 1.123 24.85*** 1.066 22.16*** 0.908 16.86*** 0.958 14.23*** 1.054 15.80* 1.212 24.13*** 
ROE -0.431 -20.06*** -0.370 -15.46*** -0.218 -6.53*** -0.805 -18.12*** -0.882 -21.93*** -0.555 -19.38*** 
BIG4 -0.067 -5.11*** 0.014 0.99 0.093 4.11 -0.227 -11.30*** -0.236 -11.77*** 0.011 0.77 
YEAR_DUMMY INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
Adj. R square 0.5988 0.5541 0.5264 0.8288 0.8266 0.5019 
 
DISP (Speculative Grade) 
Variable Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value 
Intercept -0.103 -2.33** 0.484 10.35*** 0.362 8.51*** -0.563 -10.39*** 0.051 0.88 0.440 10.28*** 
AQ1 -1.015 -25.98***           
AQ2   0.164 2.50         
NIA     1.377 10.07***       
CONS1       -0.093 -22.57***     
CONS2         -0.002 -2.37**   
ICR           -0.001 -3.09*** 
ASSET -0.004 -2.32** -0.022 -12.42*** -0.017 -10.25*** 0.023 10.33*** -0.001 -0.58 -0.020 -12.36*** 
FOLLOW -0.003 -9.30*** -0.004 -11.85*** -0.005 -14.88*** -0.001 -3.02*** 0.002 8.17*** -0.004 -11.71*** 
DIFF 0.000 0.92 0.000 0.35 0.000 1.07 0.000 -0.17 0.000 -1.16 0.000 0.27 
LEV 0.193 11.70*** 0.230 12.63*** 0.139 7.11*** 0.074 3.96*** 0.223 10.38*** 0.223 12.39*** 
ROE -0.100 -12.82*** -0.145 -16.07*** -0.048 -3.92*** -0.340 -27.21*** -0.471 -35.87*** -0.143 -14.04*** 
BIG4 -0.001 -0.14 0.025 4.90 0.047 8.51 -0.080 -14.27*** -0.101 -15.45*** 0.025 2.75 
YEAR_DUMMY INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
Adj. R square 0.5281 0.4377 0.4526 0.9193 0.8873 0.4368 
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(Panel C. Ungraded) 
FOREERROR (Ungraded) 
Variable Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value 
Intercept 0.217 11.69*** 0.260 14.17*** 0.144 8.16*** 0.285 16.22*** 0.383 21.57*** 0.306 15.76*** 
AQ1 -0.109 -7.86***           
AQ2   0.019 1.00  
       
NIA     2.969 49.03
***       
CONS1       -0.014 -16.07
***     
CONS2         -0.025 -28.95
***   
ICR           0.006 -9.46
*** 
ASSET -0.006 -8.74*** -0.008 -10.93*** -0.003 -5.08*** -0.009 -12.82*** -0.013 -19.53*** -0.008 -10.72*** 
FOLLOW -0.002 -17.71*** -0.002 -16.57*** -0.002 -21.15*** -0.001 -6.86*** 0.001 6.68*** -0.002 -18.29*** 
DIFF 0.000 29.21*** 0.000 29.16*** 0.000 31.04*** 0.000 23.70*** 0.000 23.19*** 0.000 26.79*** 
LEV 0.158 34.89*** 0.161 35.43*** 0.178 39.99*** 0.131 28.41*** 0.091 19.45*** 0.167 31.80*** 
ROE -0.273 -41.18*** -0.266 -40.30*** -0.428 -59.02*** -0.259 -37.21*** -0.195 -26.93*** -0.327 -43.16*** 
BIG4 -0.019 -8.79*** -0.019 -8.64*** -0.026 -12.04*** -0.015 -6.28*** -0.008 -3.15*** -0.040 -16.82*** 
YEAR_DUMMY INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
Adj. R square 0.1149 0.1140 0.1464 0.0843 0.0954 0.1464 
 
DISP (Ungraded) 
Variable Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value Estimate t value 
Intercept 0.171 19.79*** 0.159 18.61*** 0.090 10.91*** 0.147 17.91*** 0.196 23.49*** 0.126 15.57*** 
AQ1 -0.084 -12.91***           
AQ2   -0.083 -9.41**         
NIA     1.375 48.67***       
CONS1       -0.007 -17.84***     
CONS2         -0.013 -31.06***   
ICR           0.005 -11.00*** 
ASSET -0.004 -13.74*** -0.004 -12.61*** -0.002 -5.15*** -0.004 -11.93*** -0.006 -19.14*** -0.002 -5.19*** 
FOLLOW 0.000 -8.91** 0.000 -9.30*** -0.001 -14.77*** 0.000 -2.03** 0.001 11.65*** -0.001 -23.21*** 
DIFF 0.000 1.47 0.000 1.43 0.000 2.87*** 0.000 -0.81 0.000 -1.69* 0.000 1.89* 
LEV 0.050 23.44*** 0.047 22.23*** 0.056 26.93*** 0.035 16.30*** 0.015 6.78*** 0.046 21.21*** 
ROE -0.059 -18.97*** -0.061 -19.94*** -0.139 -40.99*** -0.070 -21.32*** -0.036 -10.54*** -0.123 -38.79*** 
BIG4 -0.005 -4.95 -0.005 -5.32** -0.009 -8.58*** -0.002 -1.59 0.002 1.84* -0.016 -15.85*** 
YEAR_DUMMY INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED INCLUDED 
Adj. R square 0.0902 0.0890 0.1209 0.0650 0.0762 0.1437 
*** Significant at the 1% level. ** Significant at the 5% level. * Significant at the 10% level. The definitions of variables are presented in TABLE 3.
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CONCLUSION 
 
Credit ratings have been widely utilized for their ability to convey information to investors easily and quickly. 
Credit ratings agencies have prospered due to their superior positions in the information-gathering process in the 
business world. However, recent news about grade reversals, sudden downgrades, and unanticipated bankruptcy 
suggests that the informational and market value of credit ratings has been overstated. In addition, the objectivity of 
the revenue structure has been called into question, as credit ratings agencies are paid by the very firms they are 
assessing. 
 
In order to measure the variables in the information environment, we use analyst forecasts. Differences between 
forecasts in the various rating categories are found to be statistically significant. Furthermore, by scoring firms at 
equal intervals on the grading scale, we find that firms with outstanding (i.e., investment) grades enjoy a relatively 
better information environment. Our analysis of the effect of the information environment on ungraded firms is 
unique in the literature. Ungraded firms in developed countries are often supported with national bonds. However, 
ungraded firms in the Korean market may be graded as investment or speculative firms. Firms that are in danger of 
receiving a speculative grade have greater incentive to improve their information environment. They may prefer to 
be ungraded rather than to risk loss of debt financing due to the “scarlet letter on their chests”. Because very little 
information is available to investors about these firms, except for a few firms with excellent credibility, we believe 
that the results of this study will be useful to analysts. The results demonstrate that the information environment in 
ungraded firms is similar to that of companies of speculative grade. That is, ungraded firms which may be similar to 
companies of average grade are analogous to firms of speculative grade in terms of the intensity of the information 
environment. Hence, ungraded firms warrant careful observation. 
 
Future costs perform a critical function, providing incentives to firms to strive towards a better credit rating in a 
higher category. Hence, we test whether firms at the margin of the investment and speculative grades are more 
motivated to achieve investment grade rating. The results demonstrate that firms of the lowest investment grade or 
the highest speculative grade do not appear to impose a more severe information environment in comparison with 
the other firms in the corresponding categories. In fact, every firm is motivated to aspire to an investment grade, 
though they may achieve this status differently. The intensity of the information environment may change drastically 
depending on the ways in which firms achieve their goals. These differences may explain this result. 
 
Lastly, after introducing new, useful credit categories, we conduct additional inter- and intra-category analyses. 
Using these categories, more detailed information about less credible firms may be presented to investors. 
Determinants such as accruals quality, conservatism, the ICR, and the proportion of intangible assets build the 
information environment in each category. Accruals quality, conservatism, and the proportion of intangible assets 
have statistically significant effects on the information environment. On the other hand, the ICR is shown to be a 
powerful determinant of the information environment for ungraded firms and those of speculative grades. However, 
this is not true for firms of investment grade. Unlike these latter firms, which attract much public attention and for 
which much information is available to the public, speculative or ungraded firms may remain unnoticed, or, even 
worse, their status may remain undisclosed. Nevertheless, our results suggest that assessment of these firms may be 
modified in accordance with their actual ability to repay debt. This finding indicates that investors may anticipate 
gains from arbitrage transactions with underestimated firms within a given category. 
 
This research shares certain fundamental similarities with previous studies based on information available to 
financial analysts. However, we extend the former discussion by conducting inter- and intra-interval analyses. The 
categories introduced here may be more useful to investors than biased credit rating grades. Another noteworthy 
contribution of this study lies in the examination of ungraded firms and their information environment, and their 
similarity to firms of speculative grade. 
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